Edith Cowan University

Research Online
Research outputs 2011
2011

Normative influence on retirement savings decisions: Do people
care what employers and the government want?
Peter G. Croy
Edith Cowan University

Paul A. Gerrans
Craig P. Speelman
Edith Cowan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks2011
Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons
10.1111/j.1742-9536.2011.00029.x
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article:Croy, P. G., Gerrans, P. A., & Speelman, C. P. (2011).
Normative influence on retirement savings decisions: Do people care what employers and the government want?.
Australian Journal of Psychology, 64(2) p. 83-91. , which has been published in final form here. This article may be
used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
This Journal Article is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks2011/217

Running Head: RETIREMENT SAVINGS

1

Normative influence on retirement savings decisions: Do people care what
employers and the government want?
Gerry Croy, Paul Gerrans, Craig Speelman
Edith Cowan University

Author Note
Gerry Croy, School of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Edith
Cowan University; Paul Gerrans, School of Accounting, Finance and
Economics, Edith Cowan University; Craig Speelman, School of
Psychology and Social Science, Edith Cowan University.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of GESB, UniSuper,
STA (AustralianSuper), and HESTA in the conduct of this research.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Gerry
Croy, School of Accounting, Finance and Economics, Edith Cowan
University, 270 Joondalup Drive, Joondalup 6027, Western Australia.
Email: gcroy@bigpond.net.au

Running Head: RETIREMENT SAVINGS

2

Abstract
The need for Australians to increase retirement savings has been widely
promoted. Yet, our understanding of the motivations of individuals to save
at a higher rate remains sparse. This paper reports the findings of a survey of
superannuation fund members and their motivations to contribute more to
superannuation and to manage their investment strategy. The paper uses the
theory of planned behaviour to focus on the important motivational
influence of social norms. The study finds that spouses appear to be the
primary source of social influence for retirement savings decisions. The
government and employers appear to exert little influence, and financial
advisors and superannuation funds take up the middle ground of social
influence. Possibilities for interventions designed to influence behaviour are
discussed and opportunities for further study are proposed.
Keywords: retirement savings, social norms, superannuation,
investment choice.
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Normative influence on retirement savings decisions: Do people care what employers
and the government want?
One of the most pressing economic issues to face Australian society over
coming decades is how retirement incomes will be funded for an increasing
proportion of retirees. It is estimated that by 2050 there will be 23.5% of the
Australian population aged 65 and over, compared to 10.7% currently (Australian
Treasury, 2007). Moreover, the proportion of people aged 65 and over relative to
people of traditional labour force age, 15 to 64 years, is projected to increase from the
2002 level of 19% to almost 41% by 2042 (Australian Treasury, 2007). These
statistics are not peculiar to Australia as a similar demographic shift is forecast for
many other developed countries. One example of the economic impact of the ageing
population is that the cost of the age pension as a proportion of GDP is expected to
increase from 2.9% in 2002 to 4.4% by 2046-47(Australian Treasury, 2002, 2007).
The global financial crisis will potentially increase this proportion as anecdotal
evidence suggests a reported 50% increase in pension applications between October
and December 2008 alone (Macklin, 2009).
A range of opinions have been expressed on the adequacy of the current level of
savings for retirement by Australians. IFSA (2006) suggest that a savings gap of $452
billion exists, meaning that “current superannuation still falls well short of the
benchmark needed to fund adequate living standards in retirement” (IFSA, 2006, p.5).
More comprehensive analyses by Rothman (2007) have identified improvements in
retirement savings adequacies which are projected to increase further into the middle
of the 21st century through a combination of increased superannuation savings,
savings outside of superannuation, and increased aged pension eligibility through the
“Better Super” reforms of the Australian government. At an individual level Russell
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et al. (2006) have also identified successful privately sponsored savings programmes.
Notwithstanding these improvements it has also been identified that more than three
million Australians are below targeted retirement savings adequacy levels (Access
Economics, 2008).
An obvious approach to improving the quality of life for individuals in
retirement, and to alleviate the forecast Australian government budget burden, is to
induce people to save through superannuation. The identified policy responses have
perhaps understandably focussed on direct “hip-pocket” incentives: eliminating tax on
superannuation withdrawals after 60 years of age; introducing generous retirement
transition rules; and gentler taper rates for pension eligibility. Early indications are
that these have been successful, but more so for those at or near retirement and those
with higher incomes (Rothman, 2007). However, a good deal more needs to be done
to motivate people to save more and to invest more efficiently for their retirement
needs. Yet, much past research regarding the psychological determinants of
individual’s retirement savings choices can be characterised as disparate in that it fails
to be couched within any integrative theoretical framework. One outcome of this
situation is a lack of opportunity to assess the relative importance of various
determinants of retirement savings behaviour.
This research project sought to redress the lack of research through a survey of
2300 superannuation fund members. The primary aim of the research was to identify
the relative importance of key behavioural determinants and to relate these to
intervention possibilities applied to the individual, the workplace, and the general
public. The theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1988) was used for these purposes as
it has been widely applied in past research and shown to be robust across diverse
behavioural contexts. The practical objectives of the research centre on identifying
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intervention opportunities to influence individuals’ behaviour to achieve higher
retirement savings accumulations. This is achieved by examining the influence of
social norms on retirement savings decisions and drawing implications for educators,
policy makers, and professionals as well identifying areas for further research.
Theory of Planned Behaviour
Retirement income provision in Australia is predicated on three pillars: (1) the
age pension; (2) mandatory contributions under the Superannuation Guarantee
(administration) Act 1992, which currently requires employers contribute a minimum
of 9% of employee wages to a complying superannuation fund; and (3) voluntary
savings, primarily through, but not restricted to the tax-preferred superannuation
system. The focus of the present research is the second and third pillars. Specifically,
investment choices of superannuation fund members receiving employer contributions
under the superannuation guarantee, and voluntary saving within the superannuation
system. Thus, the motivations of individuals to contribute to superannuation beyond
the mandated employer-level contribution, together with individuals’ motivations to
manage the manner in which accumulated savings are invested were the two
behaviours of interest to the research.
The theory of planned behaviour is predicated on three variables found to
adequately predict the intention to perform a given behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein,
2000). These variables are one’s attitude towards the behaviour, one’s perception of
social pressure as a consequence of the views and actions of significant others
(subjective or social norms) and one’s perceptions of control over performance of the
behaviour (perceived behavioural control). Measurement of these constructs is
performed directly, according to multi-item scales, and indirectly, according to
expectancy-value formulations of underlying behavioural (attitudinal), normative and
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control beliefs. Intention and perceived behavioural control together predict actual
performance of the behaviour in question.
The theory of planned behaviour has explained, on average across various
contexts, 39% of the variance in intention and 27% of the variance in behaviour
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 2000). Substantial bodies of theory and research support the
construct validity and predictive validity of the theory of planned behaviour (for a
review see Connor & Armitage, 1998; Sheeran, 2002; and Connor & Sparks, 2005).
The theory of planned behaviour was expected to effectively predict intention
and behaviour in the present retirement savings context. However, the theory does not
presume that any of its predictors will necessarily have primacy in terms of predictive
importance. Rather, relative predictive importance will depend upon the specific
behaviour and the behavioural context under investigation. The relative importance of
predictor variables in, for example, the health behaviour or travel domains may be
expected to differ to that in the retirement savings domain because each domain is
characterised by substantively different attitudinal, normative and control factor
considerations.
Social Norms
Although the present research made no prediction concerning the relative
predictive importance of antecedent variables, the subjective (social) norm variable
was expected to prove influential. The literature on the influence of normative factors
(e.g., “if others are doing it or recommending it, perhaps I should do it too”) is
limited. However, Duflo and Saez (2003) provided some expectation that normative
factors might be influential in retirement savings behaviour prediction. Duflo and
Saez randomly selected participants who were offered a cash incentive to attend a
benefits information fair. Duflo and Saez found that those who attended the fair were

Running Head: RETIREMENT SAVINGS

7

significantly more likely to enrol in the savings program. However, they also found
savings choices of individuals who did not attend the fair to mirror the savings
choices of their fair-attending peers. Duflo and Saez argued that these findings
suggested that relatively minor factors (peer effects) that do not directly affect the
financial attractiveness of saving can have a significant impact on the formulation of
saving plans.
Bailey, Nofsinger and O’Neill (2004) explored the role of social norm effects on
retirement savings decisions in a US experimental setting. Social norms were found to
have direct effects on contribution amounts. Bailey et al. (2004) suggest the results
were important because, upon first being hired, a new employee will typically be
asked to make decisions about participation and contribution levels. In an Australian
context, as a consequence of the choice of fund legislation 1 effective since July 2005,
a majority of employees are additionally asked, within the first 28 days of
employment, which fund they would like their contributions to be paid to.
The studies of Duflo and Saez (2003) and Bailey et al. (2004) were performed
in a US context. Employees in Australia are typically not asked about participation in
voluntary contribution schemes (Fielding, 2007). This tendency in Australia prevails,
potentially because a mandated contribution scheme already exists and further
voluntary schemes carry an administrative cost burden. Yet, for reasons discussed
above, there remains a need for many individuals in Australia to save more for their
retirement. Thus wider voluntary contributions scheme application and uptake
remains an important endeavor in an Australian context.
Method
Research Design

1

Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Act 2004
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The research followed the recommendations of Ajzen (2002) with a
questionnaire designed to elicit self-reported responses to questions needed for
measurement of the intention, attitude, social norms and perceived behavioural
control of the two behaviours: contributing extra to superannuation within the next
12-months; and changing the investment strategy of superannuation contributions
within the next 12-months. Subsequent examination of superannuation fund records
will enable the assessment of correspondence between participant’s intention to
perform the behaviours of interest and actual performance of the behaviours. This will
be the focus of future work. The analysis reported here is confined to the causal path
from the theory of planned behaviour’s predictor variables (attitude, subjective norm
and perceived behavioural control) to the Intention variable.
Participants
Participants were randomly selected from four Australian superannuation fund
member databases. Of a total of 20,000 questionnaires distributed by mail in 2006
(5,000 for each fund), 2,339 (12%) questionnaires were returned. It was estimated that
the 67 questions plus demographic data would take 30 minutes for participants to
complete and return. The modest response rate was hence anticipated but raised the
possibility of bias in the data (Moser & Kalton, 1972). It is not possible to compare
the demographic characteristics of survey respondents with those of non-respondents
because the funds did not supply demographic details of non-respondents. However,
the population of interest was the Australia working population. Inspection of labour
force survey information reveals that average worker-age is 39 years, males comprise
54% of the work force and average worker annual earnings are $43654 (Australian
Bureau of Statistics, 2006a). Table 1 displays summary demographic characteristics
of the questionnaire sample. Females were over represented in the sample relative to
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the overall Australian population, though it is reflective of the overall fund
membership profile of the four funds. The middle-aged were similarly over
represented and average participant income was slightly lower than the population
average. The opportunity to perform gender and age-based analyses of the data
alleviated some concerns about over/under representation of these demographic
groupings. Nevertheless, the generalisability of some aspects of results remains
subject to qualification.
<Insert Table 1>

Table 2 presents the range and proportion of occupation in the participant
sample. When compared to the Australian population (Australian Bureau of Statistics,
2006b) the most notable differences in the sample were the over-representation of
professionals and under-representation of Technicians, Sales Workers, and Labourers.
To the extent that the data were not analysed for inter-group differences relating to
these demographics, the results are subject to qualification.
<Insert Table 2>
Measures
The recommendations of Ajzen (2002) were followed in questionnaire design.
Several items served as indicators of the latent variables (attitude, subjective norm
and perceived behavioural control) modeled to predict the latent Intention variable.
Both direct and indirect measures were used to measure attitude, subjective norm and
perceived behavioural control, as discussed below.
Direct measures. The direct measure of the attitude toward the two target
behaviours was assessed by means of five 7-point unipolar evaluative semantic
differential scales (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957). The anchors of these scales,
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modeled after Ajzen (2002), were: harmful-beneficial, unpleasant-pleasant, badgood, worthless-valuable, unenjoyable-enjoyable and wrong-right.
With respect to the direct measure of subjective or social norm, respondents
were asked to indicate on 7-point unipolar scales the extent to which they believe that
most people who are important to them, or whose opinion they value, think that: they
should not-should perform the target behaviours; would expect them to perform the
behaviours (extremely unlikely-extremely likely); would disapprove-approve of them
performing the behaviours; would-would not perform the behaviours themselves; and
intend to perform the behaviours themselves (completely false-completely true).
Finally, four items modeled after Ajzen’s (2002) method directly assessed
perceived control over the target behaviours. Again using 7-point unipolar scales,
respondents were asked whether performance of the two behaviours would be
impossible-possible, whether, if the respondent wanted to, he or she could perform the
behaviour (definitely false-definitely true), the respondent’s perception of the degree
of control possessed over performing the behaviour (no control-complete control),
and whether performance of the behaviour was mostly up to the respondent (strongly
disagree-strongly agree).
Indirect Measures. Accessible beliefs are assumed to provide the cognitive and
affective foundations for attitudes, subjective norms, and perceptions of behavioural
control (Ajzen, 2002). If this assumption is correct, then beliefs can be relied upon to
obtain indirect, belief-based measures of these constructs. Accessible behavioural
beliefs are assumed to account for attitude toward the behaviour, accessible normative
beliefs for subjective norm, and accessible control beliefs for perceived behavioural
control.
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Prior to the main survey, a formative survey was conducted with an independent
sample (n=49) to elicit modal behavioural, normative and control beliefs (modal
beliefs being those beliefs most commonly held in the population). Five behavioural
beliefs were elicited in the formative research for each of the two behaviours of
interest. For contributing extra to superannuation the five modal beliefs were: “to
boost my retirement savings”; “to be able to improve my standard of living in
retirement”; “to be able to gain taxation benefits”; “having my savings tied up for a
long time”; and “having my current spending needs affected”. Similar, but
substantively different modal beliefs were elicited for investment allocation
behaviour: “to be able to achieve higher growth in my retirement savings”; “to
achieve a better matching of my risk and return preferences”; “to be able to take
advantage of market opportunities”; “to be able to achieve more personal ownership
in investment performance”; and “to incur additional costs and management fees”.
Two questions were asked in the main survey to provide an indirect measure of
attitude to the two target behaviours using the modal behavioral beliefs. First,
participants were asked to evaluate each outcome (for example “For me, to boost my
retirement savings is …”) on a 7-point good-bad scale. Second, to assess belief
strength, they were asked to rate the likelihood that performance of the target
behaviour would produce each of the outcomes on a 7-point unlikely-likely scale. For
example, participants rated how likely it was that “contributing extra to
superannuation in the next 12 months will enable me to boost my retirement savings.”
Belief strength and outcome evaluation served to compute an indirect measure of
attitude toward the behaviour in accordance with an expectancy–value model
calculated as A = ∑biei (where A = Attitude; bi = belief strength for modal belief i and
ei = outcome evaluation of modal belief i). Hence each belief strength score is
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multiplied by its associated outcome evaluation score, and the resulting products are
summed over all behavioural beliefs to produce an indirect measure of the attitude
construct.
The formative survey revealed five referent groups, common to both behaviours
of interest: spouse/partner; financial advisor; employer; government; and
superannuation fund. For each of these five identified referent groups, 7-point
unipolar scales assessed normative belief strength and motivation to comply. For
example, the statement “My employer thinks that I should make extra superannuation
contributions in the next 12 months” was rated on a 7-point scale (unlikely-likely) to
produce a measure of normative belief strength. Similarly to assess the motivation to
comply, respondents rated on 7-point scales the extent to which they care (not at all or
very much) about what each referent would want them to do about their
superannuation arrangements. A measure, comprising normative belief strength and
motivation to comply with respect to each normative belief (referent), offers a “snap
shot” of perceived normative pressures in a given population (Ajzen, 2002). An
overall indirect measure of subjective norm can be obtained by applying the
expectancy–value model calculated as SN = ∑nimi (where SN = Subjective Norm; ni =
normative belief strength i; and mi = motivation to comply i). Thus, to produce a
belief-based estimate of subjective norm, belief strength scores were multiplied by
motivation to comply scores and the resulting products were summed across all
normative beliefs.
Five beliefs that might interfere with (or promote) performance of each of the
targeted behaviours were identified in the formative study: “Not having an increase in
my/our income”; “The amount of my/our mortgage and other debts”; “Me/us having
high living expenses”; “The complexity of required procedures”; and “Not having
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improved government incentives (e.g., tax benefits)”. Two questions were asked with
respect to each control belief. One question measured the factor’s likelihood (strength
of control belief, for example, “I presently have considerable mortgage and other debt
commitments”) on 7-point (true-false or agree-disagree) scales. The second question
addressed the extent to which the factor’s presence would further or hinder
performance of the target behaviours (belief power), and responses were measured on
7-point much more difficult-not at all more difficult scales. Using an expectancy–
value formulation a belief-based measure of perceived behavioural control calculated
as PBC = ∑cipi (where PBC = Perceived Behavioural Control; ci = control belief
strength i and pi = power of control belief i). Prior to analysis, control belief strength
scores, and other belief-based scores where relevant, were reversed so that positive
responses were indicated by high scores on the 7-point scales.
Procedure
The survey questionnaire was designed to minimise participant response
ordering effects and participant fatigue effects. Fatigue effects were considered likely
given the length of the questionnaire. Different items assessing a given construct were
separated and presented in a non-systematic order, interspersed with items for the
other constructs. Additionally, the sequence of questions was rotated by dividing the
questions into four equal sets and rotating these questionnaire segments across
participants. Moreover, care was taken in the questionnaire to counterbalance high
and low endpoints of scales in order to counteract possible response sets.
Theory of planned behaviour questionnaires have been employed by many
previous studies across diverse contexts, and questionnaire design tends to closely
follow Ajzen’s (2002) recommended format. The survey was distributed by the four
superannuation funds with a covering letter of support from the fund. Before
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processing, questionnaire responses were checked for completeness and data were
entered into spreadsheets, which were, in turn, checked for accuracy of data entry.
Prior to data analysis, scale counterbalancing was reversed so that high-score
endpoints reflected positive intentions in all cases.
Results
Results for all direct and indirect measures are presented in this section. The
subjective norm variable proved the most influential predictor of intention in the
present, retirement savings, context. Following a summary of the relative importance
of attitude and perceived behavioural control, the remainder of this section elaborates
findings concerning normative influence on intentions.
Relative Predictive Importance of Behavioural Antecedents
Tables 3 and 4 present means for direct measures of the four key theory of
planned behaviour variables and correlations among these variables. Scores could
range from 1 to 7, with scale high-points representing favourable evaluations in all
scales. It can be seen from Table 3 that respondents had, on average, favourable
attitudes toward contributing extra to superannuation within the subsequent 12-month
period, they perceived moderate social pressures to do so, they had high confidence
they could achieve their behavioural goals if they were to be pursued, and they were
somewhat ambivalent in their intention to try.
<Insert Table 3>
By contrast, Table 4 shows that, compared to making extra contributions,
participants were less positive in their attitude toward changing their superannuation
investment strategy within the subsequent 12 month period. This difference between
mean scores for each behaviour was significantly different. 2 Compared to making

2

Significance at 99 percent confidence level unless otherwise noted
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extra contributions, respondents perceived social pressures as significantly lower to
make a change in investment strategy, but they had greater confidence they could
achieve their behavioural goals if they were to be pursued. However, compared to
making extra contributions, participants were significantly more ambivalent in their
intention to try to change investment strategy.
<Insert Table 4>
In sum, respondents believed, for both behaviours, that they possessed high
control over performance of the behaviours. Their attitudes toward performance of the
behaviours were moderately favourable, but, on average, they were ambivalent in
their cognitions concerning social pressure to perform the behaviours. Despite these
moderate to high motivational underpinnings, participants were, on average,
ambivalent in their intentions to try to perform the behaviours. However, they were
more inclined to try to contribute extra to superannuation rather than to change their
superannuation investment strategy.
Predictive Significance
The explanatory power for both behaviours of interest compared quite
favourably to previous theory of planned behaviour studies that typically account for
39% of the variance in intention and 27% of the variance in behaviour (Armitage and
Connor, 2001). Table 5 presents results of a regression of Intention on Attitude,
Subjective Norm and Perceived Behavioural Control. R-squared values of the
regression for the intention to contribute to extra to superannuation of 0.76 and 0.72
for changing superannuation investment strategy compare favourably to previous
applications of the theory. The results confirm that the theory of planned behaviour
predicts the intention to perform both behaviours of interest very well. The most
important predictor of intention for both behaviours of interest was subjective norm.
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Table 5 indicates that this was particularly so for change to superannuation investment
strategy, where the influence of control factors was greatly subordinate to subjective
norm and, to a lesser degree, to attitude. For extra contributions behaviour, perceived
behavioural control was marginally subordinate to the influence of subjective norm,
but the influence of perceived behavioural control was far greater when compared to
its influence on the intention to change superannuation investment strategy. Attitude
ranked third in importance among the three predictors of the intention to make extra
contributions to superannuation.
<Insert Table 5>
Normative Influence
As discussed, the subjective norm variable was found to be the most influential
predictor of the intention to perform both behaviours of interest. This section
examines subjective norms more closely using both the direct and indirect measures.
It was noted previously that, based on mean scores for the direct measures of
subjective norm, respondents generally felt moderately positive to neutral social
pressure to perform the target behaviours (see Tables 1 and 2) and social pressure was
strongly correlated with respondent’s intention. The indirect composite belief-based
measure of subjective norm was moderately correlated with the direct measure of
subjective norm (r = 0.35 for contributing extra to superannuation and r = 0.39 for
change to superannuation investment strategy). Inspection of the correlation between
normative belief-based measures and intention in Tables 6 and 7 reveals that, for extra
superannuation contributions, social pressure was most strongly associated with the
individual’s spouse or partner, as well as the individual’s financial advisor. According
to mean scores, participants viewed the wishes of financial advisors more strongly
than spouses/partners but participants were less motivated to comply with financial
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advisors than they were with spouses/partners. This same relationship between belief
strength and motivation to comply was also true for change to superannuation
investment strategy. Overall, the influence on intention of spouse/partner was stronger
than that of financial advisor for both behaviours of interest.
<Insert Table 6 and 7>
Table 6 indicates that participants held quite strong beliefs about the wishes of
government and, to a lesser extent, the wishes of their superannuation fund for
making extra contributions to superannuation. However, participants did not appear at
all willing to comply with the wishes of either the government or their superannuation
fund. Among all social referents, participants rated lowest the wishes of employers in
terms of both belief strength and motivation to comply. Accordingly, belief-based
measures of subjective norm for employers, together with the government, correlated
lowest with intention to contribute extra to superannuation. Table 7 indicates that, for
making changes to superannuation investment strategy, belief strength scores for all
referents were comparatively lower than equivalent scores for contributing extra to
superannuation. However, because a generic scale for motivation to comply was used
for both behaviours, mean scores were the same for both behaviours of interest.
Among the referent expectancy-value multiplicative measures for making changes to
superannuation investment strategy, correlations of employer and government with
intention were lowest. The employer in particular, was a referent group that
participants believed was hardly interested in their superannuation strategy change
aspirations.
Discussion
Intervention Possibilities
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The survey results provide clear policy implications, with particular regard to
increasing Australians’ superannuation contributions beyond the mandated nine
percent of the Superannuation Guarantee. When using the theory of planned
behaviour to explore intervention possibilities it is important to consider both the
mean level of an independent variable together with its importance as described by its
regression coefficient. If average scores for a particular independent variable are high
and its regression coefficient is high, then little may be gained by focusing
intervention efforts on what is already a strong source of motivation. Alternatively,
according to Ajzen (2002), if an independent variable’s mean score is low and its
regression coefficient is high then there is room to move in terms of guiding mean
scores upward with the objective of consequent increase in the mean levels of the
dependent variable (intention). The present research found mean scores for the
subjective norm independent variable to be lowest among the three predictors
(attitude, subjective norm, perceived behavioural control) of intention and its
regression coefficient was highest among the predictors. Accordingly, there appears to
be a very strong case for interventions that illuminate normative behaviour.
The uncoupling of referent scores into their separate expectancy (belief
strength) and evaluation (motivation to comply) components provides further
information about intervention possibilities. Participants believed most strongly that
the government was keen to see them contributing extra to superannuation.
Respondents have got the government’s message. However respondents were hardly
inclined to comply with the wishes of the government. Similarly respondents believed
that their superannuation fund and financial advisor had an interest in them making
extra contributions. However respondents were more motivated to comply with their
financial advisor than their superannuation fund.
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The data reveal that there is room for positive change in the influence of
superannuation funds and financial advisors. Determining the means by which change
might be achieved was beyond the scope of the research, but is a recommended focus
of future research. Some preliminary suggestions emerged from the formative study.
An apparent degree of mistrust in the minds of participants concerning perceived
vested interests of funds and advisors was revealed. That is, some participants
believed that funds and/or advisors include in their products and services dubious
claims of performance and are less than fully transparent about fee structure. The
Federal Government’s declared focus on more readable product disclosure documents
(Sherry, 2008) is well placed. It is also strongly in the interests of funds themselves to
be more transparent in seeking to receive increased contribution flows.
Although participants were inclined to comply with the wishes of their partners,
participant’s perception that their partners would wish them to contribute extra to
superannuation was neutral. Neutral perceptions about the wishes of partners may
point to a need to ensure that, on matters of superannuation, partners are dealt with
jointly rather than separately by their funds and advisors. Finally, participants
believed that employers had little interest in them contributing extra to superannuation
and, amongst all referents, participants were least inclined to comply with the wishes
of employers. Thus, another tentative conclusion is that employers are in a position to
significantly improve employee intentions to contribute extra should employers
succeed in garnering greater persuasive influence.
Inspection of normative beliefs for investment strategy change revealed that, as
might be expected when compared to extra contribution beliefs, respondents were not
of such strong belief that any of the referent groups would expect them to change their
superannuation investment strategy. However the pattern of mean belief strength and
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motivation to comply scores was similar to that which applies to extra superannuation
contributions. Thus the previous comments concerning intervention possibilities apply
equally to interventions related to changing superannuation investment strategy.
However, presently it is not an easy proposition for an individual to obtain regular
low-cost personal financial-investment guidance. Given the motivational importance
of face-to-face referents (spouse and financial advisor), printed materials, web-based
information and other impersonal forms of delivery of information and advice alone
may not be sufficient to achieve advocated outcomes.
Future Work
By mandating employer contributions to superannuation, the Australian
government has exercised a paternalistic approach to the problem of retirement
savings. Notwithstanding improvements in aggregate and average superannuation
savings levels, a large proportion of Australians remains below targeted retirement
savings adequacy levels. The research in this paper examined the motivational
antecedents of two key retirement savings behaviours: making extra voluntary
contributions and changing investment strategy.
The current research has identified several opportunities for intervention. As
well as promotional and educational programs that aim to influence beliefs of large
numbers of individuals in society, there may be much more that can be done. In this
regard, the agency of stakeholders other than the government appears to be at issue.
For example, one of the more striking findings of the research was the opportunity for
employers, with the support of funds and advisors, to more widely promote voluntary
schemes with respect to both behaviours of interest. The manner in which
promotional programs that aim to move retirement savings behaviours in the
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advocated direction are designed and delivered was not the subject of the research but
in view of the findings remains a matter worthy of further study.
Social norms represent an important area for interventions designed to influence
retirement savings behaviour. The present research adds to the findings of Duflo and
Saez (2003) and Bailey et al. (2004) by assessing the importance of social norms
relative to other behavioural determinants. The research goes further by attaching
importance weightings to different referent groups, thereby enabling better focus for
intervention efforts.
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Table 1
Sample demographics
Males (n)
Females (n)
Couples : Singles (%)
Average age (years)
Average annual income
Average household income
Average household mortgage
Average household net wealth
Average superannuation savings balance

916
1423

(39%)
(61%)
73 : 21

45
$55000
$87000
$70000
$404000
$190000

Table 2
Sample occupation classification
Managers

Professional

Technicians,
Trade
Workers

Community
and Personal
Service
Workers

Clerical
and
Admin.

Sales
Workers

Machinery
Operators
and
Drivers

Labourers

9%
9%

11%
16%

1%
10%

2%
7%

3%
11%

Sample
9%
58%
6%
(n=2216)
Census
14%
21%
13%
Source: (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2006b)

Table 3
Attitude, subjective norm and perceived control toward contributing extra to
superannuation
Correlation
SN
PBC

Variable
Mean
SD
A
Attitude (A)
4.84
1.23
Subjective norm (SN)
4.20
1.34
0.59
Perceived behavioural control (PBC)
5.24
1.65
0.38
0.35
Intention (I)
4.10
2.16
0.61
0.62
0.57
Note. Mean scores are based on scales, with possible scores ranging from 1 to 7.
All correlations were statistically significant p<.01, n = 2283.

I

-

Table 4
Attitude, subjective norm and perceived control toward changing investment strategy
Variable
Attitude (A)
Subjective norm (SN)
Perceived behavioural control (PBC)
Intention (I)

Mean
4.47
3.83
5.91
3.66

SD
1.14
1.20
1.27
1.80

A
0.59
0.16
0.61

Correlation
SN
PBC

I

0.10
0.63

-

Note. Mean scores are based on scales, with possible scores ranging from 1 to 7.
All correlations were significant, p<.01, n=2285.

0.19
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Table 5
Behaviour intention regressions
Behaviour Intention
Contributing extra to
superannuation
(n=*****)

Independent Variable
Attitude
Subjective Norm
Perceived Behavioural
Control

Change superannuation
investment strategy
(n=*****)

Attitude
Subjective Norm
Perceived Behavioural
Control

Coefficient
(Standard Error)
0.30**
(0.057)
0.74**
(0.075)
0.71**
(0.048)
0.25**
(0.043)
0.91**
(0.067)
0.13**
(0.024)

Note. ** significant, p<.01. Unstandardised coefficient from regression of Intention on Attitude,
Subjective Norm and Perceived Behavioural Control for each targeted behaviour. R2 values for
contributions to extra to superannuation 0.76, 0.72 for changing superannuation investment strategy.

Table 6
Normative belief strength and motivation to comply with important referents to make
extra super contributions

Referent
The government
Your superannuation fund
Your financial advisor
Your spouse/partner
Your employer

Belief Strength
(n)
Mean
SD
5.45
2.08
5.07
2.02
5.02
1.91
4.06
2.02
3.12
1.89

Motivation to
Comply (m)
Mean
SD
2.94
2.21
3.79
2.25
4.75
2.08
5.23
193
2.50
1.81

Correlation
nimi with
Intention
0.07
0.11
0.22
0.35
0.06

Note. Normative belief strength and motivation to comply scored from 1 (low) to 7.
nimi = (Normative Belief Strength) x (Motivation to Comply) provides indirect measure of
subjective norm.

Running Head: RETIREMENT SAVINGS

26

Table 7
Normative belief strength and motivation to comply with important referents to
change super investment strategy

Referent
The government
Your superannuation fund
Your financial advisor
Your spouse/partner
Your employer

Belief Strength
(n)
M
SD
3.90
2.21
4.01
2.25
4.46
2.08
3.65
1.93
2.77
1.81

Motivation to
Comply (m)
M
SD
2.95
2.28
3.79
2.09
4.75
1.97
5.23
1.97
2.50
1.80

Correlation
nimi with
Intention
0.14
0.16
0.24
0.33
0.15

Note. Normative belief strength and motivation to comply scored from 1 (low) to 7.
nimi = (Normative Belief Strength) x (Motivation to Comply) provides indirect measure of
subjective norm.

